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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors
by Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and David Gamage
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc. is perhaps the most 
important development in state and local tax law 
in the past decade.1 This is the third in a series of 
articles we have written to evaluate the Wayfair 
decision and to analyze key questions it has 
raised.2
In this article, we consider issues regarding 
marketplaces such as Amazon.com and eBay and 
foreign vendors. We conclude that state 
governments should apply their new nexus 
standards to the major marketplaces and should 
not let fears about in-state citizens shifting to 
purchasing from foreign vendors stand in the way 
of efforts to apply more inclusive nexus standards 
to out-of-state vendors.
Marketplaces
Wayfair is already ushering in a new regime 
for interstate sales and use tax transactions 
wherein state governments should be able to 
successfully tax most transactions between in-
state citizens and out-of-state vendors. However, 
for this new regime to be successful, it is critical 
for state governments to reach sales by small out-
of-state vendors conducted through the major 
marketplaces like Amazon and eBay.
As we have previously discussed, there are 
limits to the extent Wayfair allows state 
governments to impose collection obligations on 
out-of-state vendors.3 Importantly, the Court 
explained that it was upholding South Dakota’s 
law in part because that law provided a 
“reasonable degree of protection” for smaller 
vendors by exempting out-of-state vendors that 
deliver less than $100,000 of goods or services into 
the state or engage in less than 200 separate 
transactions for the delivery of goods or services 
into the state on an annual basis.4
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In this installment of 
Academic Perspectives on SALT, the third of a 
series of articles on Wayfair, the authors offer 
suggestions for how states can enforce their 
sales and use tax laws against marketplaces and 
foreign sellers.
1
South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
2
The two prior articles are Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske, and 
David Gamage, “Wayfair: Substantial Nexus and Undue Burden,” State 
Tax Notes, July 30, 2018, p. 447 (“Undue Burden”); and Thimmesch, 
Shanske, and Gamage, “Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax 
Nexus,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 3, 2018, p. 975 (“Tax Nexus”).
3
Id.,“Undue Burden.”
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Major marketplaces such as Amazon, eBay, 
and Google will certainly facilitate sales that, in 
the aggregate, exceed small vendor thresholds of 
this sort. But this then raises the question whether 
states can require these marketplaces to collect 
sales or use tax on transactions between in-state 
consumers and small out-of-state vendors that are 
themselves protected from having to collect that 
tax. If not, the result would be to create a 
substantial tax advantage for small out-of-state 
vendors selling via the major marketplaces as 
compared with their larger competitors. Because 
there is already an abundance of small vendors 
selling through these marketplaces and there are 
many more small retail vendors that could easily 
set up similar operations to make interstate sales, 
this would likely create major gaps in the new 
interstate sales and use tax regime.
Although Wayfair does not specifically 
address marketplaces, we see nothing in that 
decision that should prevent state governments 
from imposing sales and use tax obligations on 
the major marketplaces. We thus urge state 
governments to clearly apply their new nexus 
standards to the major marketplaces.
Of course, states will have to carefully 
consider how they will define the marketplaces 
that are subject to these new requirements. 
Marketplaces come in many different forms. 
Some are run by companies that make sales 
themselves, like Amazon. Those companies have 
tax collection processes in place and are already 
subject to state tax collection obligations. On the 
other end of the spectrum are marketplaces like 
Craigslist or Facebook Marketplace. Those 
marketplaces do not sell their own goods, do not 
facilitate payments, and generally cater to sellers 
who are making casual or isolated sales that are 
likely exempt from tax. Somewhere in the middle 
of the spectrum is a marketplace like eBay, which 
takes an active role in facilitating sales and 
payments, has a well-developed website that 
guides consumers to particular goods and 
retailers, and is a platform often used for sales by 
businesses.
States with marketplace facilitator laws on the 
books have thus far conditioned their tax 
collection obligations on different factors. In 
Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for example, the 
marketplace facilitator must participate, directly 
or indirectly, in the payment for the good.5 The 
statutes in Washington and Alabama look at a 
variety of other factors that involve the 
marketplace facilitator in the sale to some degree, 
including the provision of fulfillment services, 
price setting, branding, and return assistance, 
among others.6
We believe that states are well within their 
powers to require companies like Amazon to 
collect tax on sales that are made using its 
platform. States are also on firm footing if they 
want to require the collection of tax by vendors 
like eBay that take an active role in promoting and 
facilitating sales, including by facilitating 
payments and returns and by providing money-
back guarantees to those who use its platform. 
State power regarding passive marketplaces like 
Facebook Marketplace or Craigslist is less certain, 
but it seems that states have less of an interest in 
pursuing those marketplaces. Many of the sales 
taking place on those platforms, though certainly 
not all, will likely be tax exempt under states’ 
casual or isolated sales exemptions. We suggest 
that states focus their efforts on the first two 
marketplace categories but closely monitor the 
development and evolution of other types of 
marketplaces.
Foreign Vendors
There is broad consensus that the Wayfair 
decision about nexus also applies to remote sellers 
based in foreign countries.7 That is, assuming a 
state nexus statute passes the Wayfair regime, a 
non-U.S. vendor must collect and remit the sales 




Conn. Pub. Acts No. 18-152 stat 4 (2018); and 72 Penn. Stat. 7213(c).
6
Ala. Act 2018-529 section 3; and Wash. Rev. Code section 
82.13.010(3).
7
See, e.g., William Hoke, “Enforceability of Wayfair Decision on 
Foreign Companies Unclear,”[italicized Wayfair in title because it’s 
italicized on TN website] State Tax Notes, July 2, 2018, p. 73; and Deloitte, 
“State Tax Implications of Wayfair for Non-U.S. Companies With U.S. 
Customers,” External Multistate Tax Alert (June 27, 2018).
8
We refer to use taxes in the remainder of this article, but it may be 
that states will impose their sales taxes on foreign sales instead. As we 
discussed in a prior article, this may be significant, and the foreign 
dimension may raise issues that have not yet been considered. 
Thimmesch, Gamage, and Shanske, “Tax Nexus,” supra note 2.
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Imposing a use tax obligation on foreign 
sellers implicates both the foreign dormant 
commerce clause and the import-export clause. 
Nevertheless, it seems hard to imagine that any 
state law that passes muster under Wayfair could 
offend either of these provisions. In either case, 
and painting in broad strokes, the state law would 
only likely fail under these provisions if state 
collection efforts antagonized our trading 
partners in such a way that the federal 
government would take the side of foreign 
vendors in litigation, but without Congress 
passing a law preempting state collection efforts.9
Commentators have wisely been much more 
concerned about whether and how states are 
going to get foreign vendors to collect use tax in 
the first place.10 The consensus seems to be that 
enforcement could be a problem, both legally and 
practically. If this consensus is correct, then there 
is a further empirical question whether the result 
will be an uneven playing field between domestic 
and foreign vendors.
Let us start with the legal analysis. It is likely 
correct that states are not going to have much luck 
getting foreign governments to enforce their use 
tax collection obligations under current law.11 
Some analyses seem to imply that this is basically 
the end of the matter, but this is not so. A state can 
surely impose a tax lien on any property that the 
non-collecting vendor has in the state, for 
instance. For many states, such as New York with 
its banks, and California with its ports, this will 
likely be a significant aid in enforcement.
But what if the foreign vendor does not have 
property in the state? Again, the suggestion seems 
to be that if there is no property in the state, then 
the state is out of luck, but that too is incorrect. If 
a state takes the trouble of getting its tax lien 
reduced to a judgment in its own courts and then 
follows the procedures of the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,12 then the 
state can enforce its judgments in the courts of 
another state.13 Forms of the foreign judgments act 
have been passed in 49 states.14 In other words, 
Ohio can collect from a foreign vendor by 
enforcing its judgment against the funds it holds 
in a New York bank.
To be sure, this process could be burdensome 
and states do not typically go to this much trouble 
— but sometimes they do,15 and in any event they 
would have enormous incentive to do so if the 
feared shift to foreign vendors were to occur. In 
short, we think that states will have considerable 
enforcement power if the shift to foreign vendors 
is significant enough to warrant such an effort.
As an empirical matter, we don’t expect there 
to be a need for a large number of cross-state 
enforcement actions. We say this for several 
reasons beyond our legal analysis as to state 
power. First, as discussed previously, states 
almost certainly can and should impose collection 
obligations on major marketplaces like Amazon 
and eBay. This should greatly reduce the scope for 
foreign vendors to sell to in-state customers while 
evading collection obligations. Second, business-
to-business use tax compliance rates are high,16 so 
we are only concerned with direct sales to 
consumers. Third, the shift of sales to smaller 
foreign vendors does not present any unique 
9
As happened in Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 
(1979), but not Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 
159 (1983). See also Leanne M. Wilson, “The Fate of the Dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause After Garamendi and Crosby,” 107 Colum. L. Rev. 746 
(2007) (arguing that the key test involves a preemption analysis in light 
of nontax cases decided after Container).
10
See Hoke, supra note 7. See also Ryan Prete, “Foreign Sellers Likely 
Safe From State Online Tax Frenzy Post-Wayfair,” Bloomberg Tax, July 12, 
2018.
11
Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations section 489; Brian J. Kirkell 
and Mo Bell-Jacobs, “E-Flight Risk? Wayfair and the Revenue Rule,” State 
Tax Notes, Aug. 6, 2018, p. 551. This is not to say that governments could 
not and should not change this state of affairs. William S. Dodge, 
“Breaking the Public Law Taboo,” 43 Harv. Int’l. Law J. 161 (2002).
12
See generally C. Joseph Lennihan, “Cross-Border Collection of State 
Tax Assessments: A Primer,”[double check title of article? he lists it as 
“Enforcement” rather than “Collection” on his LinkedIn] 19 J. Multistate 
Tax’n & Incentives 8 (2009).
13
The key Supreme Court decision establishing that states must 
enforce each other’s judgments under the full faith and credit clause is 
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). Note that this 
case was about a county in Wisconsin attempting to enforce a tax 
judgment in Illinois.
14
See Lennihan, supra note 12; see also Uniform Law Commission, 
“Act: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.”
15
For instance, there are numerous cases involving New York trying 
to enforce judgments in Florida. See, e.g., New York State Commissioner of 
Taxation and Finance v. Hayward, 902 So.2d 309, 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). For an example of a local government successfully enforcing a 
judgment, see City of Philadelphia v. Austin, 86 N.J. 55, 56, 429 A.2d 568 
(1981). For examples of businesses using the act to collect from other 
businesses, see Sheldon H. Laskin, “The Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: A Government Service Designed to Benefit Nonresidents,” 
State Tax Notes, Jan. 7, 2008, p. 41.
16
See, e.g., California State Board of Equalization, “Revenue Estimate: 
Electronic Commerce and Mail Order Sales, Rev. 8/13,” at 9 (2013) 
(“Through one means or another BOE believes that registered sales and 
use tax is paid on 90 percent of California taxable B-to-B electronic 
commerce.”).
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enforcement problem for states given the legal 
and administrative need for small-seller 
exemptions. It is just that it will always be difficult 
for states to collect use tax on sales made by 
smaller vendors, regardless of where they are 
located.
Fourth, the form of goods arguably most 
susceptible to evasion — digital goods — does not 
strike us as relatively problematic for states. This 
is because digital goods, though growing in 
importance, are still only a small slice of the 
market. Also, many common business-to-
consumer digital goods are sold through 
platforms that can clearly be targeted for 
enforcement, such as the Apple App Store, 
Google Play, Netflix, and Amazon Prime Video. 
And if a foreign vendor attempted to operate 
independently of these platforms, it would still 
need to establish a payment mechanism to collect 
revenue from U.S. customers. Any sizeable 
foreign firm would likely want to access the U.S. 
capital markets, creating another opportunity for 
states to collect.
Fifth, although the potential price advantage 
from not collecting the use tax is real and 
substantial, we think that many of the 
commentators concerned about “e-flight” 
exaggerate the cost of use tax compliance in the 
same way that many remote vendors did pre-
Wayfair. Not only would the compliance costs for 
a foreign vendor with sales above the thresholds 
set by the states likely face a small cost relative to 
the value of its sales, but these compliance cost 
will not likely stand out relative to the compliance 
costs associated with other consumption taxes.
For instance, consider a Canadian vendor. At 
the national level, Canada has a credit-invoice 
VAT that is, on its own, at least as complex as any 
state’s retail sales tax, if not more so.17 If the 
Canadian vendor sells abroad, then it already 
must cope with border tax adjustments (BTAs) 
because basically every other country on earth has 
a VAT, and BTAs are a standard part of a VAT. 
Once in the new jurisdiction, the foreign vendor 
will again need to deal with a VAT, assuming it is 
making sales in the foreign country itself.18
Further, there is a significant body of literature 
to the effect that businesses generally want to 
comply with the law. This is not just a matter of 
altruism, but good sense for the business and for 
the individual managers.19 A large state tax 
liability will show up on financial statements and 
will hover over any future plans to operate in the 
United States.20 It seems improbable that large 
vendors are likely to just ignore the laws of states 
in which they make substantial sales. Remember 
that in the pre-Wayfair world, big businesses like 
Wayfair were complying with current law when 
not remitting the use tax. In the new post-Wayfair 
world, this will no longer be the case.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if a 
shift to foreign sellers ends up being a large 
problem, despite the reasons we explained above 
to think this will not be the case, then we would 
expect Congress to intervene on the side of the 
states. After all, this would be a situation in which 
all U.S. domestic vendors would be at a 
disadvantage — we would not have the same 
issue as regarding the Quill rule, under which the 
interests of different states diverged based on 
whether they had a sales tax.
For these reasons, we do not expect that 
foreign sellers will create any major gaps in the 
new post-Wayfair sales and use tax enforcement 
regime. State governments should not let fears 
about in-state citizens shifting to purchasing from 
foreign vendors stand in the way of efforts to 
apply more encompassing nexus standards for 
imposing collection obligations on out-of-state 
vendors. 
17
See, e.g., Sebastian Eichfelder and François Vaillancourt, “Tax 
Compliance Costs: A Review of Cost Burdens and Cost Structures,” at 28 
(Nov. 2014 draft) (“VAT seems to be significantly more costly than more 
simple sales taxes.”). Many Canadian provinces also have their own 
consumption taxes. On the complicated system in Canada generally, see 
Richard M. Bird and Pierre-Pascal Gendron, “Sales Taxes in Canada: The 
GST-HST-QST-RST ‘System,’” 63 Tax L. Rev. 517 (2010).
18
Foreign countries generally have de minimis rules that protect 
smaller vendors from VAT obligations, but the threshold amounts vary 
considerably. Emily Ann Satterthwaite, “On the Threshold: Smallness 
and the Value Added Tax,” 9 Colum. Tax L.J. 177, 194-195 (2018).
19
See Wei Cui, “Taxation Without Information: The Institutional 
Foundations of Modern Tax Collection,” 20 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 93-146 (2017).
20
Kirkell and Bell-Jacobs (supra note 11) make this point.
